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Abstract
In this paper, we examine the hard problems underlying asymmetric pairings, their precise relationships and how they affect a
number of existing protocols. Furthermore, we present a new model for the elliptic curve groups used in asymmetric pairings, which
allows both an efﬁcient pairing and an efﬁciently computable isomorphism.
© 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
In recent years we have seen the advent of various protocols based on pairings. However, much of the literature
uses a confusing array of underlying hard problems and differing notation. This is because the original protocols were
deﬁned in the context of pairings on supersingular curves, in which the pairing is between a group and itself, i.e.
G × G −→ GT .
In later papers the emphasis has been on so-called asymmetric pairings, where the pairing is from two (possibly)
different groups into a third, i.e.
G1 × G2 −→ GT .
As a result, it is hard to reconcile one paper against another and in addition, the area is further confused by various
authors insisting on a computable isomorphism from G2 to G1.
In this paper we elaborate on these differences in greater detail. We carefully point out what are the underlying hard
problems and how they are related. In addition we point out the reliance on the computability of the isomorphism from
G2 to G1. In many protocols the isomorphism is only needed to exist so as to deﬁne the protocol, and an isomorphism
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between two ﬁnite cyclic groups of the same order clearly exists a priori. The issue with whether the isomorphism is
computable often only becomes important in the security proof. However, in such cases one could model the security
proof with respect to a relativised result whereby the adversary has access to an oracle that computes this isomorphism.
The reason these considerations matter is that given standard representations in the literature for G2 and G1 it is
impossible to have both a simultaneously efﬁcient pairing and a computable isomorphism from G2 to G1. The only
notable exception being supersingular curves with distortion map; however, we will mainly focus on ordinary curves.
In this paper, we also present a new model for G2 which enables an efﬁciently computable pairing, a computable
isomorphism on ordinary curves plus gives a reduced bandwidth representation. The only draw back with our model
for G2 is that it appears difﬁcult to construct efﬁcient hash functions with codomain equal to G2.
Our paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we examine the underlying hard problems in asymmetric pairings and
examine their relationships and how they affect a number of existing protocols. This section is presented completely in
the abstract with no mention of elliptic curves. In Section 3, we present the main ideas we require from the theory of
pairings on elliptic curves. We summarise a number of known implementation issues and discuss some problems. In
Section 4, we present our model of the group G2 which allows both an efﬁcient pairing and an efﬁcient isomorphism
from G2 to G1. The big advantage of our solution is that it is more memory efﬁcient and that the trace and pairing
operations are simpler since they essentially “come for free”. In Section 5, we compare our model with other models
of G2 and we end with some other possible representations of G2. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
We would like to thank Steven Galbraith for comments on an earlier version of this paper.
2. Abstract pairing-based protocols
In this section, we examine a number of pairing-based protocols and point out some interesting observations which
motivate the work in this paper. To emphasise the points we wish to make more clear, we present our arguments and
observations completely abstract, without reference to any underlying concrete groups. Then in later sections when we
specialise to elliptic curve groups one can more easily see how the problems discussed in this section apply to elliptic
curve groups.
We ﬁrst need to deﬁne an overall problem instance on which to base our pairing based protocols.We deﬁne a pairing
problem instance to be a tuple  = (q,G1,G2,GT , P1, P2, pˆ) where G1, G2 and GT denote groups of prime order
q. For convenience we shall write G1 and G2 additively and GT multiplicatively. We let P1 and P2 denote two ﬁxed
generators of G1 and G2, respectively. Our pairing problem instance also contains a computable bilinear pairing
pˆ : G1 × G2 −→ GT .
We denote the pairing by pˆ, to stress that in this section we are dealing with an abstract pairing. In future sections,
we shall use the notation tˆ when dealing with the concrete Tate pairing; in this case the groups G1 and G2 become
subgroups of elliptic curves and GT is a multiplicative subgroup of a ﬁnite ﬁeld.
Since G1 and G2 have the same prime group order there clearly is a group isomorphism  between G2 and G1 such
that (P2) = P1. In this section, we make no assumption as to whether , or −1, is efﬁciently computable.
We shall call one of our groups Gi , for either i = 1 or i = 2, randomly samplable if it is possible to simply write
down a random element of the group, without necessarily computing rP i for some random value of r. This notion will
become important in later sections when analysing our pairing based protocols. In particular, if a group is not randomly
samplable then the only way one can produce new elements within a protocol is by computing rP i for some value of r.
Given a pairing problem instance one can deﬁne a number of variations of the Bilinear Difﬁe–Hellman problem, as
follows:
Deﬁnition 1 (The BDHi,j,k problem). Given a pairing problem instance  = (q,G1,G2,GT , P1, P2, pˆ) and values
i, j, k ∈ {1, 2} we deﬁne the BDHi,j,k problem to be the following: given aP i , bP j and cP k , with a, b, c ∈ Fq , we are
asked to compute pˆ(P1, P2)abc.
The advantage of any adversary A against this problem is deﬁned to be
Pr[= pˆ(P1, P2)abc :  ← A(aP i, bP j , cP k,)].
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Deﬁnition 2 (The coBDHj,k problem). Given a pairing problem instance = (q,G1,G2,GT , P1, P2, pˆ) and values
j, k ∈ {1, 2} we deﬁne the coBDHj,k problem to be the following: given aP 1, aP 2, bP j and cP k , with a, b, c ∈ Fq ,
we are asked to compute pˆ(P1, P2)abc.
The advantage of any adversary A against this problem is deﬁned to be
Pr[= pˆ(P1, P2)abc :  ← A(aP 1, aP 2, bP j , cP k,)].
Deﬁnition 3 (TheBDHi,j,k problem). TheBDH

i,j,k problem is the sameas theBDHi,j,k problem,with theonlydifference
that the adversary now has access to an oracle which computes values under the isomorphism  mentioned above, but
does not necessarily have access to an oracle which computes the inverse isomorphism −1. Again the advantage is
deﬁned to be
Pr[= pˆ(P1, P2)abc :  ← A(aP i, bP j , cP k,)].
There are clearly relationships between these problems:
• The problems BDHi,j,k and BDHi′,j ′,k′ are polynomial time equivalent if i + j + k = i′ + j ′ + k′, the same holds for
the problems BDHi,j,k and BDH

i′,j ′,k′ .
• In the case when i + j + k i′ + j ′ + k′ then an efﬁcient algorithm to solve BDHi,j,k implies an efﬁcient algorithm
to solve BDH
i′,j ′,k′ . Hence, the BDH

1,1,1 problem is possibly harder than the BDH

2,2,2 problem.
• On the other hand, the problems BDHi,j,k and BDHi′,j ′,k′ do not appear to be related when i + j + k = i′ + j ′ + k′.
• An efﬁcient algorithm to solve BDHi,j,k implies an efﬁcient algorithm to solve BDHi,j,k , but the converse is only true
when the map  exists and is not just provided as an oracle.
• An efﬁcient algorithm to solve BDHi,j,k implies an efﬁcient algorithm to solve coBDHj,k and an efﬁcient algorithm
to solve coBDHj,k implies an efﬁcient algorithm to solve BDH

2,j,k .• Finally, we also remark that an efﬁcient algorithm to solve the discrete logarithmproblem in either groupG1,G2,GT ,
implies an efﬁcient algorithm to solve all the above problems.
We can also deﬁne variations of the computational Difﬁe–Hellman problem.
Deﬁnition 4 (The CDHi,j,k problem). Given a pairing problem instance  = (q,G1,G2,GT , P1, P2, pˆ) and values
i, j, k ∈ {1, 2} we deﬁne the CDHi,j,k problem to be the following: given aP i and bP j , with a, b ∈ Fq , we are asked
to compute abP k . The advantage of any adversary A against this problem is deﬁned to be
Pr[= abP k :  ← A(aP i, bP j ,)].
A variant CDHi,j,k of this problem can be deﬁned similarly to above, as can similar relations between the problems.
In addition, we see that an efﬁcient algorithm to solve CDHi,j,k can be used to solve the BDHi,j,k′ , problem when
k = k′.
Decisional variants of the above problems can also be deﬁned, as can then the resulting gap problems (i.e. the above
computational problems relative to an oracle which solves the equivalent decisional problem). Note, however that
certain decisional problems are easy, for example the decision variant of CDHi,j,k with i = j is simple since one can
use the pairing to test for a valid Difﬁe–Hellman tuple.
We shall now turn to discussing what these concepts imply for a number of pairing based cryptosystems.
2.1. The Boneh–Franklin encryption scheme
Here we discuss the Boneh–Franklin ID-based encryption scheme [3] in the context of our abstract pairings above.
We assume the reader is familiar with the scheme and so only recap on the salient points for which we need do deﬁne
notation.
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Given a pairing problem instance=(q,G1,G2,GT , P1, P2, pˆ) the Boneh–Franklin scheme requires the following
four elements of the groups G1 and G2 to be deﬁned.
(1) The public key of the trust authority is deﬁned to be R = xP i , for i ∈ {1, 2}, and some secret value x ∈ Fq .
(2) The public key of the user is deﬁned to be QID = H(ID) ∈ Gj , where j ∈ {1, 2} and H is a cryptographic hash
function from {0, 1}∗ to Gj .
(3) The ephemeral key in the ciphertext is given by U = rP k , for k ∈ {1, 2}, and some ephemeral secret value r ∈ Fq .
(4) The secret key of the user SID ∈ Gl , for l ∈ {1, 2}, must satisfy either SID = xQID, or SID = (xQID).
From this set up we can instantly notice a number of points:
• Due to point 2 the group Gj must be randomly samplable, otherwise one would never be able to implement such a
hash function.
• Due to point 4 we must have either l = j , or if there is an oracle to compute  we may also have (j, l) = (2, 1).
• The encryptor needs to compute the pairing of either QID and R, or QID and (R), or (QID) and R. This implies
that either i = j , or if there is an oracle to compute  we may also have i = j = 2.
• The decryptor needs to compute the pairing of either SID and U, or SID and (U), or (SID) and U. This implies
that either k = l, or if there is an oracle to compute  we may also have k = l = 2.
Since to implement any scheme requiring an oracle for , we need not just an oracle, but an actual efﬁcient and explicit
algorithm, this implies the following: if  is not efﬁciently computable then to implement the Boneh–Franklin scheme
one requires either (i, j, k, l) = (1, 2, 1, 2) or (2, 1, 2, 1). However, if  is efﬁciently computable then one can have
any one of the following tuples for (i, j, k, l)
(2, 2, 2, 2), (1, 2, 2, 2), (2, 2, 1, 2), (1, 2, 1, 2)(2, 2, 2, 1), (1, 2, 2, 1), (2, 1, 2, 1).
Subject to the constraint that the group Gj is randomly samplable.
If we now turn to the proof of the Boneh–Franklin encryption scheme, in particular the proofs of Lemmas 4.2 and
4.6 of [3], and extending them to the more general situation of G1 = G2 as considered in our work, we see that the
hash function H is modelled as a random oracle via the following simulation: for any identity IDt the random oracle
H is computed via QIDt = btPj , for some random bt , with the corresponding values of SIDt computed via btR, or
(btR). This implies that either i = j , or  is available via oracle access to the adversary and i = 2 and j = 1.
Hence, the existing security proof of the Boneh–Franklin encryption scheme implies that:
• If  is not efﬁciently computable then one needs to select (i, j, k, l) = (2, 1, 2, 1) and the security proof of the
scheme is relative to the hardness of the BDH2,1,2 problem. In other words, although the scheme in this instance may
not require an efﬁciently computable  the security proof is relative to an adversary which has oracle access to .
Hence, if one is unwilling to accept such a relativised security result then one has to revert to basing ones security
on the coBDH1,2 problem, as pointed out by [3]. However, the coBDH1,2 problem is also somewhat unnatural.
• If  is effectively computable then one needs to select (i, j, k, l) from one of the following
(2, 2, 2, 2), (2, 2, 1, 2), (2, 2, 2, 1), (2, 1, 2, 1).
The security proof is then relative to the hardness of BDHi,j,k , except that now  is not only given as oracle access
to the adversary, but is actually computable. Hence, the hardness is relative to the standard BDHi,j,k problem. Given
our comments on the relative hardness of these problems earlier, one should probably choose (i, j, k, l)= (2, 2, 1, 2)
or (2, 1, 2, 1).
Hence, if one wishes to have a scheme which is both provably secure and for which the security is related to a well-
studied problem, i.e. the BDHi,j,k problem, then one needs to use a pairing for which there is an efﬁciently computable
isomorphism.
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2.2. The Boneh–Lynn–Shacham signature scheme
This section contains a similar analysis of the BLS short signature scheme [4] in the context of our abstract pairings
above.
Given a pairing problem instance = (q,G1,G2,GT , P1, P2, pˆ) the BLS requires the following three elements of
the groups G1 and G2 to be deﬁned.
(1) The public key of the user is deﬁned to be R = xP i , for i ∈ {1, 2}, and some secret value x ∈ Fq .
(2) The hash of a message is deﬁned to be QM=H(M) ∈ Gj , where j ∈ {1, 2} and H is a cryptographic hash function
from {0, 1}∗ to Gj .
(3) The signature is given S ∈ Gk , where either S = xQM or S = (xQM).
From this set up we can instantly notice a number of points:
• Due to point 2 the group Gj must be randomly samplable, otherwise one would never be able to implement such a
hash function.
• Due to point 3 we must have either j = k, or if there is an oracle to compute  we may also have (j, k) = (2, 1).
• To verify a signature we need to compute two pairings:
◦ We need to compute the pairing of either QM and R, or QM and (R), or (QM) and R. This implies that either
i = j , or if there is an oracle to compute  we may also have i = j = 2.
◦ We also need to compute the pairing of either S and Pi , or S and (Pi), or (S) and Pi . This implies that either
k = i, or if there is an oracle to compute  we may also have i = k = 2.
This implies the following: if  is not efﬁciently computable then to implement the BLS scheme one requires either
(i, j, k) = (1, 2, 2) or (2, 1, 1). However, if  is efﬁciently computable then one can have any one of the following
tuples for (i, j, k)
(1, 2, 2), (2, 1, 1), (2, 2, 1), (2, 2, 2).
Subject to the constraint that the group Gj is randomly samplable.
We now turn to the proof of the BLS signature scheme, in particular the simulation inGame1 of the security proof. The
simulation of the hash function H works in roughly the same way as the simulation in the proof of the Boneh–Franklin
encryption scheme mentioned earlier. The hash function H(Mt ) is simulated via btPj , which means the signature
queries can be answered via btR, if i = k, or (btR) if i = k and i = 2.
Hence, the existing security proof of the Boneh–Franklin encryption scheme implies that:
• If  is not efﬁciently computable then one needs to select (i, j, k) = (2, 1, 1) and the security proof of the scheme
is relative to the hardness of the CDH2,1,1 problem. In other words, although the scheme in this instance may not
require an efﬁciently computable  the security proof is relative to an adversary which has oracle access to .
• If  is effectively computable then one needs to select (i, j, k) from one of the following
(2, 1, 1), (2, 2, 1), (2, 2, 2).
The security proof is then relative to the hardness of CDHi,j,k , except that now  is not only given as oracle access
to the adversary it is actually computable, hence the hardness is relative to the standard CDHi,j,k problem.
2.3. Other protocols
We now discuss a number of other protocols. Our list is not exhaustive and we point out just a number of problems.
In Boneh et al.’s paper [2] on short group signatures the authors present a group signature scheme in a pairing problem
instance . The main protocol is based on very different assumptions to those presented here, but the security proof
relies on an adversary with access to the isomorphism . However, as an aside the authors of [2] present a simpliﬁed
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scheme which is based on a decisional variant of the CDH1,1,1 problem. However, for this problem to be hard the map
−1 must be hard to compute. In general, it does appear that −1 is hard to compute for all examples where one knows
how to compute  efﬁciently, except again for supersingular curves with distortion map.
In Boneh and Shacham’s paper [5] on group signatures with veriﬁer-local revocation one needs an isomorphism from
G2 to G1 so as to be able to implement the scheme. Of all the papers which present their protocols in the asymmetric
pairing setting, this is the only one we could ﬁnd which actually required a computable isomorphism to be able to
implement the protocol. This is not to say that one of the protocols described in the symmetric pairing setting in the
literature when generalised to the asymmetric setting will not require a computable isomorphism. However, there is
a problem with implementing the scheme of [5] in our context below. The scheme also requires a hash function with
domain equal to G2, which appears hard to construct for our representation of G2 given in Section 4.
3. Pairings on elliptic curves
We now turn to actual concrete pairings based on (ordinary) elliptic curves. We assume that our elliptic curves are
deﬁned over a ﬁeld Fp of characteristic greater than three. To aid computational efﬁciency we choose curves which
have equations of the form
E : y2 = x3 − 3x + b,
where b ∈ Fp. We assume that #E(Fp) is divisible by a large prime q and that there is a small integer k such that q
divides pk − 1, but q does not divide pl − 1 for any integer l < k. Such curves are often called MNT curves as an
algorithm for their construction was ﬁrst given in [6].
Given such a curve the points of order q, i.e. the group E[q], are deﬁned over Fpk and they form a two-dimensional
vector space over Fq . As a basis of this vector space we can take P1 and P2 where P1 is a point of order q in E(Fp)
and P2 is a point of order q which is deﬁned over Fpk but not Fp.
The modiﬁed Tate pairing tˆ is a bilinear pairing operating on the groups
tˆ : E[q] × (E(Fpk )/q · E(Fpk )) −→ F∗pk .
The pairing is such that tˆ (P , P ) = 1 for all P in E[q]; indeed, the pairing is trivial for all pairs which are linearly
dependent when projected to the vector space E[q]. It is therefore common to restrict the ﬁrst component to the points
of order q in E(Fp) and the second component to a subgroup of E(Fpk ) which is linearly independent of the points of
order q in E(Fp). The question arises as to which subgroup should be chosen for the second component.
As mentioned earlier, a number of protocols require a pairing for which there is a computable isomorphism from
G2 to G1. In this situation, the natural choice for G1 is to be equal to E(Fp)[q] and the natural isomorphism from a
subgroup of E(Fpk ) to E(Fp) is given by the trace map
(P ) = Tr(P ) =
∑
∈Gal(F
pk
/Fp)
P .
However, if G2 is a subgroup of E(Fpk ) of order divisible by q which is distinct from G1, then it appears difﬁcult to
construct a hash function with codomain G2. Clearly by generating a random point of E(Fpk ) and then multiplying by
the cofactor #E(Fpk )/q we will obtain a random element of E[q]. But the probability of this random element in E[q]
lying in the chosen subgroup G2 is 1/q.
We ﬁrst present an optimisation trick for computing the pairing already described in [1]. If k is even, i.e. k = 2d,
then we let  denote an element of Fpd which is a quadratic non-residue, i.e. we have
Fpk = Fpd [
√
].
If we let d be odd then one can select  ∈ Fp, which means that multiplication and division by  can be performed in
linear time.
We can now consider the quadratic twist of E over the ﬁeld Fpd given by
E′ : y2 = x3 − 3x + b.
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Notice, we use this form of the quadratic twist of the curve rather than the form used in [1] so as to enable standard
tricks to efﬁciently compute the group law on E′(Fpd ).
There is an injective group homomorphism
 :
{
E′(Fpd ) −→ E(Fpk ),
(x, y) 
−→ (x,√y).
Using a standard implementation trick, see [1], the Tate pairing of an element P ∈ E(Fp) with an element Q ∈ Im()
can be computed more efﬁciently than the pairing on an arbitrary element of E(Fpk ).
The group order ofE′(Fpd ) is given byN ′d=pd+1+td , whilst the group order ofE(Fpd ) is given byNd=pd+1−td .
We note that since k is the smallest integer such that pk − 1 is divisible by q we see that pd + 1 must be divisible by q.
However, on noticing that
Nd + N ′d = 2(pd + 1),
and that Nd is also divisible by q, we see that N ′d is also divisible by q. In particular we see that E′(Fpd ) contains a
subgroup of order q. We let this subgroup be generated by P ′2.
Hence, 〈(P ′2)〉 is a subgroup of order q of E(Fpk ) which is linear independent of the subgroup generated by P1.
Since in this paper G1 will always be given by 〈P1〉, we shall denote 〈(P ′2)〉 by G⊥1 .
If we pair an element of G1 with an element of E(Fpk ) with x-coordinate in Fpd then our pairing computation can
be performed efﬁciently [1]. The following lemma shows that there is essentially only one such subgroup G2.
Lemma 1. The only subgroups of E(Fpk ) of order q which consist of elements with x-coordinates contained in Fpd
are given by G1 and G⊥1 .
Proof. LetG be such a subgroup and let P = (x, y) be a generator, then clearly all elements inGwill have x-coordinate
in Fpd if and only if P does. If we set P1 = (1/k)Tr(P ) = (x1, y1) and P⊥1 = P − P1 = (x⊥1 , y⊥1 ), then Tr(P⊥1 ) = O
and P = P1 + P⊥1 .
The element P1 is contained in G1 and P⊥1 is contained in G⊥1 , see for instance [1, Corollary 1]. Looking at the
addition formulae one sees that x ∈ Fpd implies that y1 · y⊥1 ∈ Fpd and so y1 is the conjugate of y⊥1 , up to some
multiple in Fpd . However, since y1 ∈ Fp and y⊥1 ∈ Fpk\Fpd , this would imply either P1 = O or P⊥1 = O and so the
lemma follows. 
Hence, if G2 = G⊥1 then tˆ is an efﬁciently computable pairing from G1 × G2 to the subgroup of order q of F∗qk . If
however we select G2 = G⊥1 then the speedups described in [1] no longer apply.
On the other hand, it is easy to see that Tr(P )=O for all elements P ∈ G⊥1 . Hence, if we select G2 =G⊥1 then there
does not exist a natural computable isomorphism from G2 to G1, no matter what choice of P1 is made. However, as
our earlier analysis points out, if no such computable isomorphism exists then either various pairing-based schemes are
not provably secure, or are provably secure relative to a new assumption (namely the adversary has access to an oracle
to evaluate the isomorphism), in other cases the protocol simply cannot be computed without access to a computable
isomorphism from G2 to G1.
4. Efﬁcient pairings and computable isomorphisms
In this section, we present a newmodel forG2 which allows us to achieve both an efﬁcient pairing computation, plus
an efﬁciently computable isomorphism from G2 to G1. However, this comes at the expense of G2 not being randomly
samplable. Thus, due to our discussion in an earlier section this restricts slightly the role of G1 and G2 in various
protocols, in particular it will be impossible to construct hash functions with codomain equal to G2. In this section we
keep the elliptic curve notation of the previous section.
In setting up our system we deﬁne G1 = 〈P1〉 as before. We then set
P ′1 = [1/k (mod q)]P1.
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This implies that
Tr(P ′1) = kP ′1 = P1.
Our group G2 we represent as the cyclic subgroup of E(Fp) × E′(Fpd ) generated by (P ′1, P ′2) where P ′2 is an element
of E′(Fpd ) of order q, as in the previous section. We shall denote this choice of G2 by Gˆ2.
First we note that it appears impossible to construct a cryptographic hash function with codomain equal to Gˆ2, or
to generate elements at random from Gˆ2 without creating a multiple of the generator, since it appears hard to generate
completely at random two elements from different groups which have the same discrete logarithm with respect to the
group generators without also computing the discrete logarithm.
However, it is easy to detect whether a pair (Q1,Q2) is actually an element of Gˆ2, given that Q1 ∈ E(Fp) and
Q2 ∈ E′(Fpd ). If (Q1,Q2) ∈ Gˆ2 then there is an x ∈ Fq such that Q1 = xP ′1 and Q2 = xP ′2. Hence, checking for
inclusion in Gˆ2 comes down to testing whether
tˆ (Q1,(P
′
2)) = tˆ (xP ′1,(P ′2)) = tˆ (P ′1,(xP ′2)) = tˆ (P ′1,(Q2)).
Note that these two Tate pairings are easy to compute since the second coordinate lies in the image of  and so the
tricks of [1] can be applied.
We let the pairing of elements of G1 and Gˆ2 be denoted by pˆ, and the isomorphism from Gˆ2 to G1 be denoted by
. We also deﬁne an injective homomorphism from Gˆ2 to E(Fpk ) deﬁned by
	 :
{
Gˆ2 −→ E(Fpk ),
(Q1,Q2) 
−→ Q1 + (Q2).
We deﬁne for P ∈ G1 and Q = (Q1,Q2) ∈ Gˆ2 that
pˆ(P ,Q) = tˆ (P , 	(Q))
= tˆ (P ,Q1 + (Q2))
= tˆ (P ,Q1) · tˆ (P ,(Q2))
= tˆ (P ,(Q2)).
The last equality follows since Q1 is linearly dependent on P, so we can simply set pˆ(P ,Q) = tˆ (P ,(Q2)). We
note that since the second coordinate of the Tate pairing is in the image of  that the pairing pˆ(·, ·) can be computed
efﬁciently. We also note that all the properties of a pairing in cryptography are satisﬁed by our pairing pˆ(·, ·).
To deﬁne the isomorphism from Gˆ2 to G1 we use the trace map as in the previous section, which gives:
(Q) = Tr(	(Q)) = Tr(Q1 + (Q2))
= Tr(Q1) + Tr((Q2)) = Tr(Q1)
= kQ1.
This follows since the image of always has trace zero and since Q1 is in E(Fp) its trace is easily calculated by taking
the kth multiple of Q1. As another alternative one could take (Q) = Q1.
Hence, with this representation G2 = Gˆ2, we achieve both an efﬁciently computable pairing and an efﬁciently
computable isomorphism from G2 to G1.
5. Comparison
In this section, we return to the Boneh–Franklin encryption scheme; a similar analysis applies to the other schemes
mentioned earlier. We wish to explain the effect of the different choices for G2, namely G⊥1 and Gˆ2 and a general G2.
A general G2, by which we mean an arbitrary subgroup of order q of E(Fq2d ) which is not equal to G⊥1 we shall denote
by G′2. The pairing can be computed in an efﬁcient manner by using the following trick from [7]
pˆ(P ,Q) = tˆ (P ,Q − (Q)),
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Table 1
Comparison of different representations of the group G2
G2 Size of g ∈ G2 in log2 p Computable isomorphism Efﬁcient pairing Hash to G2 Underlying hard problem
G⊥1 d N Y Y BDH

2,1,2 or coBDH1,2
Gˆ2 d + 1 Y Y N BDH2,2,1 or BDH2,1,2
G′2 2d Y Y N BDH2,2,1 or BDH2,1,2
where  is the qd -power Frobenius automorphism. Note, that the point Q − (Q) has x-coordinate in Fqd and so the
pairing can be computed efﬁciently.
We summarise the main computational and bandwidth considerations in Table 1. Bandwidth, i.e. the size of elements
ofG2, is measured in multiples of log2 p.We recall that when we have a computable isomorphism the BDHi,j,k problem
is equivalent to the BDHi,j,k problem.
Note, by reducing the hardness in the last two cases to BDH2,2,1 rather than BDH2,1,2 we can select ciphertext sizes
which are smaller, i.e. k = 1 in our previous discussion of Section 2.1. However, this would require a mechanism to
hash into the group G2, which appears impossible. Hence, it is only practical to reduce the security to BDH2,1,2 which
implies that ciphertexts are larger.
6. Another choice of G2
One can obtain a group for G2 which has both a computable homomorphism to G1, efﬁcient pairings and for which
one can derive a hash function with codomain equal to G2. However, one now has to select a group which is not cyclic
of order q, but has exponent q.
It is easy to construct hash functions from an arbitrary bit string to both G1 and G⊥1 . As G2 we now select the
subgroup of G1 × E′(Fpd ) of order q2 and exponent q. There are two ways to represent elements of G2 which give
performance improvements.
(1) In the ﬁrst method we hold elements in G2 as the pair of elements (Q1,Q2) where Q1 ∈ G1 and Q2 ∈ E′(Fpd )
where Q2 is of order q. Representing Q in this way require roughly (d + 1)log2 p bits. Hashing into G2 is now
(theoretically) trivial, and computing the homomorphism to G1 is obtained via
((Q1,Q2)) = Tr(Q1 + (Q2)) = kQ1 or ((Q1,Q2)) = Q1.
The pairing is also computed in a similar way via
pˆ(P , (Q1,Q2)) = tˆ (P ,Q1 + (Q2)) = tˆ (P ,(Q2)).
(2) In the second method we hold elements in G2 as a point Q ∈ E(Fqk ), where Q has order q. Representing Q
in this way requires roughly 2d log2 p bits. Hashing into G2 is now (theoretically) trivial, and computing the
homomorphism to G1 is obtained via (Q) = Tr(Q). The pairing can be computed in an efﬁcient manner using
the previous trick we presented for the group G′2.
In both cases, hashing is performed by generating an element at random on the appropriate curve (using a standard
construction from a cryptographic hash function) followed by multiplication by the appropriate cofactor. This is rather
an expensive operation in both cases. The cofactor in the ﬁrst case has size roughly pd/q, whilst in the second case
the cofactor has size roughly pk/q = p2d/q. Hence, hashing into G2 may become a computational bottleneck of any
scheme.
In addition, the security proofs and protocols may now need to be slightly altered as almost all security proofs are
written on the assumption that G2 is cyclic of order q. Another problem is that there is a small probability, namely
1 − 1/q, that the pairing of a non-trivial element of G1 with a non-trivial element of G2 may result in a trivial value
for the pairing. This eventuality will also need to be considered in the various protocols which require pairings. We do
not discuss these two issues further except to point out that for all protocols we have looked at such problems can be
easily ﬁxed with this choice of G2.
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7. Conclusion
Wehave described the various hard problems that occur in the asymmetric pairing setting and someof the relationships
between them. In particular, we have seen how the precise proof techniques used in pairing protocols can have subtle
implications for the nature of the underlying hard problem in the asymmetric setting. This is particularly the case in
relation to the existence of a computable isomorphism from the second to the ﬁrst group.
We have also elaborated on efﬁcient representations for the second group in the asymmetric setting which try to
address some of the issues presented in the ﬁrst part of the paper. However, the choice for the second group raises one of
the following problems: it either affects whether one can implement certain protocols, whether the protocol is efﬁcient
and whether it has a security proof relative to a standard, non-relativised, problem. We hope our paper provides an
impetus to researchers to ﬁnd sets of pairing parameters which do not have these problems.
References
[1] P.S.L.M. Barreto, B. Lynn, M. Scott, On the selection of pairing-friendly groups, SelectedAreas in Cryptography—SAC 2003, Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, vol. 3006, Springer, Berlin, 2004, pp. 17–25.
[2] D. Boneh, X. Boyen, H. Shacham, Short group signatures, Advances in Cryptology—CRYPTO 2004, Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
vol. 3152, Springer, Berlin, 2004, pp. 41–55.
[3] D. Boneh, M. Franklin, Identity based encryption from the Weil pairing, SIAM J. Comput. 32 (2003) 586–615.
[4] D. Boneh, B. Lynn, H. Shacham, Short signatures from the Weil pairing, Advances in Cryptology—ASIACRYPT 2001, Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, vol. 2248, Springer, Berlin, 2001, pp. 514–532.
[5] D. Boneh, H. Shacham, Group signatures with veriﬁer-local revocation, 11th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security—CCS, 2004, pp. 168–177.
[6] A. Miyaji, M. Nakabayashi, S. Takano, New explicit conditions of elliptic curve traces for FR-reduction, IEICE Trans. Fundam. Electron.
Commun. Comput. Sci. E84-A (2001) 1234–1243.
[7] M. Scott, Faster identity based encryption, Electron. Lett. 40 (2004) 861.
